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I
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to the proceedings below, from which order
this appeal is taken, did not include appellants Charles Schultz
and Robert Pett.

The parties below were plaintiff Sure-Tech, LLC

and defendants E.M.L. Projects, Ltd., Ecology Management, Ltd.
and Waste Products, Inc.
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IV
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction would be vested in this Court pursuant to
the transfer of this appeal to this Court from the Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j), were appellants proper
parties to bring this appeal.
V
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Issues of Fact
1.

Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling

Charles Schultz ("Schultz") did not revoke his offer to transfer
his membership interest in Sure-Tech, LLC to Steve Evans
("Evans") or his nominee prior to the time Evans accepted the
offer?

(Tr. at 69-70.)
2.

Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling

that Schultz and Robert Pett ("Pett") did not have managerial
responsibility in Sure-Tech at the time Sure-Tech and defendant
entered into a stipulation of dismissal?
3.

(Tr. at 71.)

Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling

that Evans had authority to enter into the stipulation of
dismissal on behalf of Sure-Tech?
4.

(Tr. at 71.)

Does the evidence show that the court erred in

relying on Evans' testimony, to the extent the court did so rely?

1

Issues of Law
1.

Did the trial court rule correctly on the admission

of documentary evidence and witness testimony?
2.

(Tr. at 69.)

Did the court rule correctly, as a matter of law,

that Evans had authority to dismiss the litigation on behalf of
Sure-Tech?

(Tr. at 71.)
3.

Did the court rule correctly, as a matter of law,

on the admissibility of evidence?
4.

(Tr. at 56, 69.)

Did the court rule correctly in denying appellants'

Rule 60(b)(3) motion?

(R. at 1427.)

The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), except
that the court's denial of appellants' Rule 60(b)(3) motion is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938;

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
VI
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-112.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-122.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-125.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (a) .
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
Utah R. Evid. 608.
Utah R. Evid. 609.
Utah R. Evid. 1002.
2

Utah R. Evid. 1003.
Utah R. Evid. 1004.
Complete copies of these determinative statutes and
rules are attached as Appendix A.
VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Appellant, who was not a party to the action below,
seeks to have the Court's stipulated dismissal of the underlying
action brought by Sure-Tech, LLC set aside on the grounds that
the court below wrongly determined that Steve Evans had authority
to settle the case on behalf of plaintiff Sure-Tech, LLC.
B. Proceedings Below
This case was brought by Sure-Tech, LLC, a limited
partner of E.M.L. Projects, Ltd. ("E.M.L.P.").

Schultz, the

appellant, represented Sure-Tech until the court disqualified him
by order entered April 4, 1995 after a hearing held November 23,
1994.

(R. at 1235-40.)

Subsequently, Sure-Tech retained Scott

Daniels of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, who settled the action
on behalf of Sure-Tech.

Daniels entered an appearance on behalf

of Sure-Tech (R. at 1256-57), and Sure-Tech and E.M.L.P. filed a
stipulation of dismissal with the court on or about April 21,
1995.

(R. at 1252-53.)

Schultz then wrote to Judge Brian

claiming that he and Pett were the managers and sole members of
Sure-Tech and that Daniels had no authority to represent Sure3

Tech.

(R. at 1258.)

Daniels requested a hearing to "take

evidence and determine who has authority to act on behalf of
Sure-Tech."

(R. at 1261-63.)

On May 22, the court scheduled a one-half hour hearing
on May 30 to hear the motion to dismiss.

(R. at 1290-91.)

hearing actually lasted more than two hours.
30, 1995 hearing ("Tr.") at 69. ) 1

The

(Transcript of May

The notice of hearing was

silent as to whether the court would take evidence (see R. at
1290) ; however, the request for hearing had mentioned the need
for evidence.

(See R. at 1262.)

At the hearing, Schultz neither

objected to the taking of evidence nor sought a continuance.
(See, e.g., Tr. at 3.)

Moreover, in addition to legal argument,

Edwin Guyon ("Guyon"), who represented Schultz at the hearing,
put on both witness testimony and documentary evidence of his own
and cross-examined witnesses put on by Daniels.

(See, e.g., Tr.

at 17 (cross-examination by Guyon of S. Evans); Tr. at 19
(entering into evidence of the purported operating agreement of
Sure-Tech); Tr. at 57 (direct examination by Guyon of Schultz).)
C. Disposition
After argument and allowing additional witnesses and
proffers from Guyon (Tr. at 53-56), the court ruled that by
Schultz's letter of November 17, 1994 (PL's Ex. 6) Schultz and
1

The transcript, which was not prepared until January
31, 1997, was not paginated as part of the record when this brief
was prepared. Hence, references to the May 30, 1995 hearing
transcript are to the transcript page. (See Appendix B.)
4

Pett offered to convey their interests in Sure-Tech to Evans or
his nominee (Tr. at 69); that Evans accepted that offer by his
January 9, 1995 letter (Ex. 7; see Tr. at 70); that on April 9,
the members of Sure-Tech held a meeting and "in reliance on the
documents of November of 1994 and January of 1995" substituted
Evans as the new registered agent in place of Schultz and
replaced Schultz and Pett as managers (Tr. at 70), and then
negotiated and finalized the Settlement Agreement.

(Tr. at 71.)

The court upheld the Settlement Agreement and dismissed the
action.

(Tr. at 71.)
Thereafter, Schultz filed a Rule 60(b)(3) motion,

seeking to set aside the order on the ground that Evans lied
under oath at the May 30, 1995 hearing.

(R. at 1368-80.)

Schultz attached a letter dated November 22, 1994 from Schultz to
Evans, which Guyon had sent to the Court the day after the
hearing.

(See R. at 1298-1304.)

Schultz claimed the November 22

letter revoked his November 17, 1994 offer, and, as Evans now
admitted he had received the November 22, 1994 letter, showed
(R. at 1373-76.)2

that Evans had perjured himself.

The court

denied Schultz's motion without opinion on August 9, 1995.
at 1427.)

(R.

Schultz originally filed a notice of appeal on July 3,

1995 (R. at 1404-05) and filed an amended notice on August 29,
1995.

(R. at 1434-35.)
2

The exhibits to Schultz's Rule 60(b)(3) motion appear
to have been misfiled in the record, and appear at R. 1306-57.
5

D. Statement of Facts
The court's order dismissing this case was entered in
the record May 30, 1995 and appears at R. 1297.

A review of

appellant's Statement of Facts reveals that many of the "facts"
on which they rely to demonstrate the trial court's error were
not actually before the court at the time it ruled.

(See

Appellants' Statement of Facts KH 1, 2, 21, 28, 29, 35-40.) 3
Moreover, most of Schultz's "facts" are badly misstated.

An

accurate rendition of the relevant facts actually before the
trial court follows.
1.

Sure-Tech is a Utah limited liability company

formed on January 14, 1993.

The Articles of Organization of

Sure-Tech indicated that Robert Pett and Charles Schultz were the
original managers.

It did not state who the members were.

(See

P L ' s Ex. 4 at 2, received into evidence at Tr. 12. ) 4
2.

Sure-Tech was formed, at least in part, to

distribute profits from E.M.L.P., a limited partnership of which

3

Although exhibits supporting much of appellants' facts
in paragraphs 1 and 2 were introduced by appellants at the May
30th hearing, appellants do not reference those exhibits.
Instead, they cite to subsequent submissions and do not inform
this Court which of the listed items were received in evidence by
the trial court.
4

All citations to exhibits are to the exhibits
introduced at the May 30, 1995 hearing, unless otherwise noted.
As those exhibits also had not been paginated as part of the
record at this writing, they are referred to by their exhibit
number assigned at the hearing.
6

Sure-Tech was a 20% partner.

(Testimony of Schultz, Tr. at 25;

R. at 3.)
3.

On April 11, 1994, Sure-Tech, represented by

Schultz, filed this lawsuit to dissolve E.M.L.P.

(See R. at 2-

80.)
4.

In May 1994, plaintiff and defendants each filed a

motion to disqualify the other party's counsel.
1263A-L.)5

(R. at 96-151,

Both motions were heard November 23, 1994.

court sustained both motions.
5.

The

(R. at 1172, 1174.)

The Memorandum Opinion and Order granting

E.M.L.P.'s motion to disqualify Schultz as counsel for Sure-Tech
was entered April 4, 1995.

(R. at 1235-40.)

The court

disqualified Schultz because he had been employed by, had
rendered legal advice to, and had received a monthly retainer
from E.M.L.P., one of the defendants.
6.

(R. at 1237-38.)

On November 17, 1994, just prior to the hearing on

the motions to disqualify, Schultz wrote to Evans offering to
return to Evans or his nominee his and Robert Pett's interests in
Sure-Tech.

(PL's Ex. 6; Tr. at 11-12.)
7.

Evans accepted Schultz's offer on January 9, 1995,

and designated his parents, Beatrice and Fred Evans, as his

5

The papers seeking disqualification of Callister
Nebeker & McCullough, filed in May 1994, appear to be misfiled in
the record.
7

nominees to receive Schultz's interest in Sure-Tech.

(PL's Ex.

7; Tr. at 12.)
8.

On or about April 4, 1995, Evans, his mother

Beatrice Evans, his father Fred Evans, and Lionel Koon, as
members of Sure-Tech, agreed to settle this lawsuit and various
other disputes between them and the defendants to this lawsuit.
(See P L ' s Ex. 3 at 2.)
9.

At an April 9, 1995 meeting called by Evans, Evans,

his father Fred Evans, and Lionel Koon, who at the meeting became
a five percent member of Sure-Tech, voted Schultz and Pett out as
managers and replaced Schultz as registered agent.

(Pl.'s Ex. 5;

Tr. at 7.)
10.

Sure-Tech then retained Daniels to represent it,

and Sure-Tech and E.M.L.P. entered into a Stipulation of
Dismissal of this lawsuit.

(R. at 1252-53, 1256-57.)

A copy of

the Stipulation was sent to Schultz.
11.

Upon receipt of the Stipulation, Schultz wrote to

the court claiming that Daniels lacked authority to enter into
the Stipulation on behalf of Sure-Tech, as he and Pett were SureTech's managers and sole members.
12.

(R. at 1258.)

Daniels then requested an evidentiary hearing to

determine who had authority to represent Sure-Tech.

(R. at 1261-

62. )
13.

The court scheduled the hearing for one-half hour

on May 30, 1995.

(R. at 1290.)
8

14.

At the hearing, both sides presented evidence and

made argument to the court.

Schultz was represented by Guyon.

Guyon did not object to the court taking evidence and did not
seek a continuance.
15.

(See Tr. at 3.)

Evans testified as to Schultz's offer to transfer

his interest in Sure-Tech, Evans' acceptance of that offer, the
April 9, 1995 meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, and the
Settlement Agreement he signed on behalf of Sure-Tech to end the
lawsuit.

(Tr. at 3-12, 20-21.)

He also testified that he had

never before seen the Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech introduced
at the hearing by Guyon.
16.

(Tr. at 19; see also id. at 18.)

Schultz also testified at the May 30 hearing.

(See Tr. at 23-27, 57-64.)
17.

He testified that he and Pett were the only

members of Sure-Tech.

(Tr. at 57-58.)

He introduced various

organizational documents of Sure-Tech in support of his claim.
(See P L ' s Exs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G (received at Tr. at 56).)
18.

Schultz admitted sending Exhibit 6 to Evans and

receiving Exhibit 7 from Evans.

(Tr. at 25-26.)

Schultz

testified that in the November 17th letter (Ex. 6) "we were
offering to convey it [Sure-Tech] to him [Evans]."
19.

(Tr. at 61.)

Schultz also testified, however, that ten days or

two seeks after sending the November 17 letter (Ex. 6) he send
Evans another letter revoking his offer.

9

(Tr. at 27.)

Although

Schultz said he had the revocation letter in his files, he did
not bring it to the court.
20.

(Tr. at 27-28.)

Evans denied having received a letter revoking

Schultz's November 17, 1994 offer.
21.

(Tr. at 29.)

Guyon recognized he had "some evidentiary

problems" without the letter.

(Tr. at 35.)

Subsequently, he

requested additional time to get the alleged revocation letter to
the court.

(Tr. at 50.)

Guyon then put on additional testimony.

At all times the court remained willing to consider the letter if
it arrived before the hearing ended.
22.

(See Tr. at 50, 65.)

Although the court indicated it would give little

weight to any evidence other than the alleged revocation letter
itself, it gave Guyon the choice of calling witnesses or
proffering their testimony.

Guyon chose to make a proffer of the

testimony of Schultz and Lisa Spivey, secretary to Schultz,
although both were in the courtroom.
subsequently put Schultz on the stand.
23.

(Tr. at 53.)

He also

(Tr. at 57-60.)

Based on the evidence before it, the court found:

The hearing was set for 9:00 a.m., May 30, 1995. It is
now ten after eleven. The estimate for the hearing was
one hour. The Court still has not received any letter
from the office of Mr. Schultz, indicating that there
was a change in the position of Mr. Schultz to convey
his interest to the Evanses on the Sure-Tech company.
And the Court finds that the best evidence rule
applies, and, absent any document to the contrary, the
Court does not give any substantial weight to the
representations made that after November 17, 1994, and
before January 9 of 1995, or before April 9 of 1995,
10

there was ever any change in Mr. Schultz' willingness
to convey his interest in Sure-Tech.
The Court further finds as follows: The chronology
of events are as follows: November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans
is the recipient of a letter authored by Mr. Schultz,
wherein he stated as follows: "It is ny intention to
convey my interest in Sure-Tech, and Bob," assuming
that's Bob Pett, "will also convey his interest in
Sure-Tech to you or to whoever you direct. Advise me
to whom you wish it conveyed. I will not dismiss the
case against EML so that you or whomever you direct can
decide what to do." That's precisely what occurred
several months later. "However, I am going to withdraw
as counsel for Sure-Tech after the conveyance and after
the pending motions are decided."
The next document which the Court finds to be
significant is the letter of January 9, 1995, the
recipient being Mr. Charles A. Schultz, the author
being Mr. Steve Evans. That letter confirms, in
substance, their willingness to accept a conveyance, by
Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, the withdrawal of any
interest they have in Sure-Tech, and conveying any
interest, whatever it may be, percentage-wise, of SureTech to the Evanses.
The next document of interest is the April 9, 1995
meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, wherein, in
reliance on the documents of November of 1994 and
January of 1995, they conducted their business,
substituted Mr. Schultz as the registered agent,
replaced Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, pursuant to the
prior agreement, as managers, and proceeded to
designate new managers and new registered agents.
The next document of interest is a letter dated
April 21, 1995, to Mr. Evans, authored by Mr. Schultz,
wherein, in paragraph 6, Mr. Schultz again reconfirms
that he and Mr. Pett will convey all interest in SureTech. I mean, the only documents in the record before
the Court are consistent in that regard.
The Court finds that, based on all of those
documents, and the conduct of the business owners, that
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, at least for purposes of
today's hearing, did not have any managerial
responsibilities in Sure-Tech. Thereafter, a
settlement agreement was entered into between the
11

plaintiffs, Sure-Tech, LLC, and the defendants, EML
Projects, et al.
The Court finds that there was both express and
implied authority by the plaintiffs and the defendants
to enter into the settlement agreement.
The Court further finds that the parties relied to
the mutual detriment of each other in negotiating and
finalizing the settlement agreement and that the
settlement agreement is upheld by this Court.
The Court further finds that the order of
dismissal is appropriate in connection with the
settlement agreement, and it will be signed May 30,
1995.
(Tr. at 69-71.)
24.

The day following the hearing, Guyon sent the

court a copy of the alleged letter of revocation (hereafter the
"November 22 letter").

It states:

I cannot believe you did not bother to come to the
hearing today. The case against EML was only filed in
order to secure your rights to work in the
environmental field and particularly the right to use
the waste water treatment system you assigned to EML
However, due to your failure to attend the hearing and
due also to Lionel's failure to attend, I was
disqualified as counsel for Sure-Tech.
If you do not care about protecting your interests, I
sure as hell don't. I am going to settle the suit
against EML on the best terms for Sure-Tech. A
settlement may have some incidental and unintentional
affect on your patent claims. Therefore, I suggest
that you obtain personal legal representation to advise
you.
Sincerely:
/&/

Charles A. Schultz
(R. at 1302.)
12

25.

Subsequently, Schultz filed a motion for relief

from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3), Utah R. Civ. P.
1371-76.)

(R. at

In his memorandum in support of his Rule 60(b) motion,

Schultz argued that the November 22 letter proved (a) that he had
revoked his November 17, 1994 offer, and (b) that Evans, because
he denied receiving the letter of revocation, had committed
perjury.
26.

The court denied Schultz's Rule 60(b) motion

August 9, 1995.
27.

(R. at 1427.)

Appellants first filed their Notice of Appeal July

31, 1995, and filed an Amended Notice of Appeal after the court
denied their Rule 60(b) motion.

(R. at 1404-05 and 1434-35.)

VIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants lack standing to prosecute this appeal
because they were not parties below.

Under precedent from both

the both Utah and United States Supreme Courts, unless a person
formally becomes a party below, he may not bring an appeal.

In

addition to appellants' lack of party status, policy
considerations militate against allowing these appellants
standing to appeal.

Schultz, an attorney knowledgeable about

rules of procedure, was earlier disqualified from representing
Sure-Tech in this very litigation.

In addition, allowing these

plaintiffs to pursue this appeal will open the floodgates of
litigation to disgruntled corporate shareholders and limited
13

liability companies, and is contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b112.
If the Court finds that appellants have standing,
however, it must affirm the decision below on the merits because
the trial court committed no reversible error of fact or law.
Appellants are precluded from challenging the court's factual
findings by their failure to marshal the evidence supporting that
decision.

When that evidence is marshalled, it is apparent that

the great weight of the evidence supports the trial court's
findings of fact, which must not be disturbed.
Appellants' legal arguments also fail.

Although legal

conclusions are reviewed for correctness, appellants have shown
no bases for finding any of the trial court's rulings to be
erroneous.

Moreover, appellants' failure to preserve the issues

they raise in this appeal bars them from raising those issues
here.
Finally, appellants have not met their burden of
showing that the trial court erred in denying their Rule 30(b)(3)
motion.

This court must review that denial under an abuse of

discretion standard.

Because appellants did not in their Rule

60(b)(3) motion show by clear and convincing evidence that a
party's fraud precluded them from getting a fair hearing, the
judge properly denied the motion.

14

IX
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO APPEAL,
AS THEY WERE NOT PARTIES BELOW
A.

Only One Who Was a Party Below Has Standing
to Appeal.

Only a party has standing to bring an appeal.

Thus, in

Wright v. Brown, 574 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal filed by an insurance company which had
been a party to the case but which was dismissed from the suit
prior to final judgment being entered.

Because the appellant "is

no longer a party to the action before us," said the court, it
"has no standing to take this appeal."

Id. at 1155.

See also

Rule 3(b)-(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (referring
repeatedly to "party" or "parties").
The United States Supreme Court also requires that an
appellant formally become a party below.

In Marino v. Ortiz, 484

U.S. 301, 484 U.S. 1082 (1988), a case that procedurally
parallels this case, a group of police officers brought an action
claiming civil rights violations.
of a consent decree.

The case was resolved by entry

Another group of police officers, who were

not named parties and did not seek to intervene, appeared and
"presented their objections to the District Court at the
hearing."

Id. at 303.

When the court entered the consent

decree, the latter group sought to appeal.
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Id.

In holding that

the petitioners lacked standing to appeal, the Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those
that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is
well settled."

Id. at 304.

Although the Second Circuit had

noted in dismissing the appeal that there might be exceptions to
that general rule, the Supreme Court said, "We think the better
practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for purposes
of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course, appealable."
Id.
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsberg, 874 P.2d 729 (Nev.
1994), cited by appellant in an earlier submission in this
appeal,6 reached the same conclusion on similar facts.

That

case involved a shareholder suit that was resolved by a
settlement after a hearing before the court.

Appellants were

other shareholders who appeared at the hearing to contest the
settlement.

The Nevada court in that case recognized that

appellants were "aggrieved" by the trial court's order.7

They

nonetheless lacked standing to appeal, held the court, because
they were neither parties nor intervenors below.

Id. at 734-35.

6

See Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition to Sure-Tech,
LLC's Motion to Dismiss, filed before the Supreme Court, App. No.
950343, 9/25/95, at 9.
7

Appellants cited this case for the proposition "that
the appellate court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an
aggrieved party." That citation, while correct, does not support
appellants' right to appeal, however, as they were not
parties
below.
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Here, Schultz and Pett stand in the same position as
did the petitioners in Marino and appellants in Valley Bank.
Although they asserted an interest in the outcome of the
litigation, they were not parties below and did not seek to
intervene.

Marino and Valley Bank teach that Schultz's

appearance as a witness, even an aggrieved one, does not give him
status as a party.
B.

Public Policy Also Dictates a Denial
of Standing in This Instance.

In addition to the controlling precedent,//£hree/public
policy reasons exist here to deny standing to Schultz and Pett.
First, the court disqualified Schultz from representing Sure-Tech
in this lawsuit.

(R. at 1235-40.)

Schultz seeks to do an "end

run" around that disqualification by doing on his own behalf what
the court barred him from doing on behalf of Sure-Tech.
prevents that, however.

Statute

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-112 specifically

states:
A member of a limited liability company is
not a proper party to proceedings by or
against a limited liability company, except
when the object is to enforce a member's
right against, or liability to, the limited
liability company.
Appellants' only possible claim to standing is their
alleged status as members of Sure-Tech.

Under no stretch of the

imagination could this appeal be considered an action to enforce
any rights appellants have against Sure-Tech.

Instead,

appellants seek to enforce Sure-Tech's "right" to continue
17

litigating this suit, by having the settlement dismissed.

Thus,

even had Schultz and Pett tried to intervene below, they would
not be proper parties to the suit.

Hence, they are not proper

parties here.
Second, Schultz is a long-time member of the Bar of
this state.

He formed Sure-Tech.

He knows the Rules of Civil

Procedure relating to intervention.

He knows the steps one can

take to otherwise legally protect one's interests.
requirements of appellate procedure.

He knows the

Schultz also knew that the

hearing would adjudicate an issue in which he claimed an
interest.

Yet, he chose not to seek to intervene or take other

steps to preserve his alleged rights.
Third, allowing these appellants to pursue their appeal
would unleash a flood of potential appellants.

Granting standing

to these appellants on the basis of their claim of membership in
the plaintiff limited liability company would grant limited
liability company members and corporate shareholders the right to
appeal settlements by or decisions against their limited
liability company or corporation when they were dissatisfied with
the outcome of the litigation.

The existence of such a right is

not only contrary to basic notions of standing, but it would
wreak havoc on corporations and limited liability companies who
could not be sure of the finality of any judgments to which they
were a party.
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Based on controlling law and the policy considerations
enumerated above, the Court should rule that Schultz and Pett
lack standing to bring this appeal.

Even if the Court were to

decide that Schultz and Pett have standing to bring this appeal,
however, the appeal must be dismissed on the merits for the
reasons discussed below.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BELOW FULLY SUPPORTS
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION TO APPROVE
THE STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL
Appellants claim numerous infirmities with the court's
decision to dismiss the action below.

While appellants try to

phrase many of the issues as questions of law, their main
complaint with the trial court is factual: They argue that the
trial court erred in not ruling that Schultz withdrew his offer
to convey his interest in Sure-Tech to Evans prior to Evans'
acceptance, and that Evans, therefore, had no authority to enter
into the stipulation of settlement.

These are clearly issues of

fact.
This Court must uphold the lower court's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure; Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987);
Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
"Findings are clearly erroneous if they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or if the appellate court reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
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Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, it is axiomatic that the court may only
consider the evidence before it in making its ruling.

See Barker

v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553-54 (Utah App. 1987) (party's
failure to present evidence on damages at trial precludes
subsequent consideration).

Here, the facts before the trial

court, as opposed to Schultz's opinions and late-filed documents,
provide ample support for the trial court's determination that
Evans had authority to enter into the stipulation of settlement.
The court found that:
[B]ased on all of th[e] documents, and the conduct of
the business owners, [] Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, at
least for purposes of today's hearing, did not have any
managerial responsibilities in Sure-Tech . . . . [ w h e n ]
a settlement agreement was entered into between the
plaintiffs, Sure-Tech, LLC, and the defendants, EML
Projects, et al.
(Tr. at 70-71.)

The court set forth on the record the evidence

it relied on in reaching its conclusions.

The first relevant

fact, the court found, was that on
November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans is the recipient of a
letter authored by Mr. Schultz, wherein he stated as
follows: "It is my intention to convey my interest in
Sure-Tech, and Bob," assuming that's Bob Pett, "will
also convey his interest in Sure-Tech to you or to
whoever you direct. Advise me to whom you wish it
conveyed. I will not dismiss the case against EML so
that you or whomever you direct can decide what to do."
That's precisely what occurred several months later.
"However, I am going to withdraw as counsel for SureTech after the conveyance and after the pending motions
are decided."
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(Tr. at 69-70.)
finding.

Exhibit 6, received at Tr. 12, supports this

Both Schultz and Evans testified that the November 17,

1994 letter operated as an offer to convey Schultz's and Pett's
interests in Sure-Tech.

(Tr. at 12, 25-26, 61.)

(See also Tr.

at 38-39 (Guyon agrees that the November 17th letter was intended
to "do exactly what it said").)

Moreover, in a colloquy with the

judge, Guyon admitted that the November 17, 1994 letter contained
no condition precedent or a time limit on acceptance.

(Tr. at

41-42.)
The next document the court found significant was
[T]he letter of January 9, 1995, the recipient being
Mr. Charles A. Schultz, the author being Mr. Steve
Evans. That letter confirms, in substance, their
willingness to accept a conveyance, by Mr. Schultz and
Mr. Pett, the withdrawal of any interest they have in
Sure-Tech, and conveying any interest, whatever it may
be, percentage-wise, of Sure-Tech to the Evanses.
(Tr. at 70.)

Exhibit 7, received at Tr. 12, supports this

finding as does the uncontroverted testimony of Schultz (Tr. at
27) and Evans (Tr. at 12).
Schultz argues, however, that he withdrew the November
17th offer before Evans accepted it, taking away Evans' power of
acceptance and making Evans' actions, as a purported member of
Sure-Tech, a nullity.

His argument relies on his testimony that

he revoked his offer in a letter he sent to Evans "ten days to
two weeks after this November 17 letter" (Tr. at 27), and the
proffered testimony of Lisa Spivey, Schultz's secretary, that she
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mailed the letter.

(Tr. at 55.)

revocation of the offer.

Evans denied ever receiving any

(Tr. at 29.)

Schultz did not introduce the "revocation" letter
because he did not have it with him, although he testified it was
in his files.

(Tr. at 27-28. ) 8

Schultz mentioned no other

correspondence concerning the offer to convey or its revocation
at the hearing.9

Because Schultz could not produce the alleged

revocation letter, the court struck Ms. Spivey's testimony and
did not "give any substantial weight" to Schultz's testimony
regarding the letter.

(Tr. at 69.)

Next, the court found relevant the April 9, 1995
meeting of Sure-Tech members:
[T]he April 9, 1995 meeting of the members of SureTech, LLC, wherein, in reliance on the documents of
8

Despite Schultz's readiness to introduce other
documents into evidence, and despite ample time to send someone
to get the letter, Schultz never did produce the document in
court on May 3 0th. Schultz's argument that the court erred in
not allowing him more time to get this letter incorrectly
reflects the actual course of proceedings below and the law.
(See Point IV.C. below.) His argument that the court should have
reversed its decision when it did receive the letter after the
hearing is addressed in Point V. below.
9

Nor did Schultz mention or allude to any other evidence
of his revocation in his Rule 60(b) motion. (See November 22
letter, attached as Exhibit 1 to Lisa Spivey's affidavit, Exhibit
E to Pett's and Schultz's memorandum in support of their Rule
60(b) motion.)
(See R. at 1350-52, 1374.) The mention of
another revocation letter from Schultz to Evans dated December
22, 1994, first appeared in this case in appellants' memorandum
in support of finding that appellants are parties to this
proceeding.
(R. at 1445-1503 at 1493.) Schultz's mention of
that December 22 letter in his Statement of Facts No. 21 is
disingenuous, at best.
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November of 1994 and January of 1995, they conducted
their business, substituted Mr. Schultz as the
registered agent, replaced Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett,
pursuant to the prior agreement, as managers, and
proceeded to designate new managers and new registered
agents.
(Tr. at 70.)
Exhibit 5.

The minutes of that meeting were introduced as
Schultz did not contend that that meeting did not

occur as reflected in Exhibit 5.

Thus, that evidence is also

uncontroverted.
In further support of its factual finding that Schultz
did convey to Evans whatever interest in Sure-Tech he owned, the
court also cited Exhibit 11:
[A] letter dated April 21, 1995, to Mr^Evans, authored
by Mr. Schultz, wherein, in paragraph^g^MA Schultz
again reconfirms that he and Mr. Peten^ij^r convey all
interest in Sure-Tech. I mean, the only documents in
the record before the Court are consistent in that
regard.
(Tr. at 70.) 10
The other factual challenge Schultz raises to the
court's decision involves the veracity of Evans.

The credibility

of witnesses is uniquely the province of the trial judge, and an
appellate court will not second guess the trial court.

10

Sorenson

Schultz introduced evidence in the form of Sure-Tech's
organizational documents and annual filings to show that he owned
99% of Sure-Tech and that Evans owned none. (Exs. A-G and Tr. at
53-60.) Evans disputed that showing, claiming he always had a
membership interest based on his right to Sure-Tech's profits.
(See Exs. 1 and 8 and Tr. at 8-10.) That evidence is all
immaterial, however, given the court's finding that Schultz
conveyed "all interest in Sure-Tech" to Evans via the November
17th letter. (Tr. at 70.) (Emphasis added.)
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v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d at 1147.

To the extent

that Judge Brian relied on the witnesses' testimony, he obviously
found Evans' testimony credible.

Because nothing in the record

indicates that finding was clearly erroneous, it must be upheld.
Id.

Evans' testimony was consistent with the documentary

evidence noted above that showed that whatever interest Schultz
had in Sure-Tech prior to January 9, 1995 when Evans accepted
Schultz's offer to convey his and Pett's interests in Sure-Tech
to Evans, after that time he had no further interest.
The foregoing recitation of the facts before the court
shows that the great weight of the evidence before the court
supports its factual findings and its determination to enter the
stipulation of settlement or discounted Evans' testimony.

Its

ruling is not clearly against the weight of the evidence and must
be upheld.
POINT III
APPELLANTS MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE COURT'S FACTUAL
FINDINGS BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS
Appellants' factual challenges to the court's decision
that Evans had authority to enter into the stipulation of
settlement on behalf of Sure-Tech must fail for a second reason,
as well.

Contrary to appellate requirements in this state,

appellants have failed to inform this Court of much of the
evidence that supports the trial court's decision, either in
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their statement of facts or in the body of their brief.11

Utah

law requires that,
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of
fact on appeal, n[a]n appellant must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making
them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), quoting In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989) .
Marshalling the evidence requires that the appellant
"present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
findings the appellant resists."

the very

Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d

939, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis in original).

Because

appellants have failed to marshal the evidence, this Court must
accept as true the findings of the lower court.

Interiors

Contracting v. Smith, Halander & Smith A s s o c , 881 P.2d 929, 933
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); accord. Commercial Union Assocs. v.
11

In fact, appellants' statement of facts contains more
argument and procedural details than it does facts. Appellants
characterize evidence supporting the trial court's decision as
"false" or "purported" (see e.g., Appellants' Fact Nos. 16, 17,
18), while they present evidence that supports their position as
absolute fact. (See, e.g., Appellants' Fact No. 21.)
Appellants' statement of facts also misrepresents the record at
the time of the court's ruling, as it cites to documents and
claims that were not before the court when it entered the Order
of Dismissal. (See Appellant's Fact Nos. 2, 21, 28, 29, 35-40,
which all refer to items entered in the record subsequent to the
challenged ruling.)
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Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Robb v. Anderton,
863 P.2d at 1328.
Although the record in the case is over 1500 pages in
length, the salient facts were all introduced at one two-hour

set forth tfte faiTCsne deemed important in his ruling from the
bench at the close of the May 30th hearing.

(Tr. at 69-71.)

The task of marshalling the facts on this appeal was thus a
simple one.

In spite of the simplicity and importance of the

task, however, appellants failed to inform this Court of the
following facts that support the trial court's ruling:
1.

Schultz admitted under oath that in his November 17,
1994 letter to Evans he offered to convey his interest
(Tr. at 25-25, 61) .12

in Sure-Tech to Evans.
2.

In the November 17th letter, Schultz indicated that he
would "not dismiss the case against EML so that you or
whomever you direct can decide what to do."
see also Tr. at 69.)

3.

(Ex. 6;

(Emphasis added.)

Counsel for appellants admitted the November 17th offer
did not contain any condition precedent or time
limitation on Evans' right to accept.

12

(Tr. at 42.)

Instead, Schultz misleadingly states in Fact No. 17
that Evans "claimed that Mr. Schultz had sent Evans a letter
offering to convey Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's ownership of
Sure-Tech to the Evanses."
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4.

Schultz understood that at all times the Evanses had
rights to a significant share of the profits of SureTech.

(See P L ' s Exs. 1 and 8; Tr. at 25, 57-58

(testimony of Schultz).)
5.

On April 21, 1995, Schultz again confirmed his intent
to convey all his interest in Sure-Tech to Evans.
(PI.'s Ex. 11; Tr. at 70.)

6.

The Evanses held a meeting of members of Sure-Tech in
April 9, 1995, at which time they voted to replace
Schultz as registered agent for Sure-Tech and replace
both Pett and Schultz as managers of Sure-Tech.

(Tr.

at 7. )
7.

Evans then caused Sure-Tech to file amended Articles of
Organization on April 10, 1995.

(Tr. at 20; see also

P L ' s Ex. 2 at 2.)
A comparison between these omitted facts and the full
panoply of facts the court cited in reaching its decision shows
that appellants omitted from their facts virtually all the facts
that support the court's ruling.

Having failed to inform this

Court of these facts, which support the court's decision, Schultz
should not be allowed to challenge the factual basis for the
court's decision.
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POINT IV
THE COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ARE EACH CORRECT
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Appellants also challenge four of the court's rulings
on legal grounds.

They challenge the court's reliance on Evans'

testimony, the court's finding that Evans had authority to act on
behalf of Sure-Tech, the court's alleged failure to allow Schultz
time to get the November 22nd letter, and the court's alleged
preclusion of Lisa Spivey's testimony.
and IV of Appellants' Br.)

(See Points I, II, III

As shown below, each of these

challenges is based on a false premise.

Moreover, when reviewed

for correctness, as conclusions of law must be, each of the
court's rulings withstands appellants' challenge.
A.

The Court Committed No Error in Accepting
Evans' Testimony.

Appellants first claim that the court erred as a matter
of law in basing its decision on Evans' "perjured" testimony.
That argument has no merit.

Though cloaked in the guise of a

legal argument, appellants' claim of perjury is in reality no
more than a claim that the trial judge erred as a matter of fact
in its decision.

As noted above, the credibility of a witness is

for the trial judge, and will not be set aside absent clear
error.

Moreover, trial courts also have a great deal of

discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence.
v. Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993).
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Russell

In any event, appellants failed to raise and preserve
the issue below.

An appellant may only raise on appeal issues

presented and preserved below.

Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926

(Utah Ct, App. 1992); see also Estate of Russell, 852 P.2d 997,
999-1000 (Utah 1993); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) .

Preservation requires a "contemporaneous objection

or some form of specific preservation of claims of error."
v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 360.

State

The grounds for the objections "must

be 'distinctly and specifically stated' on the record."

Estate

of Russell, 852 P.2d at 1000 (quoting Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d
14 (Utah 1988)).

As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "A

reviewing court . . .

is not simply a depository in which the

appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research."
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988).
Schultz did not adequately preserve his claim of
perjury below, because his only basis for impeaching Evans'
testimony was improper and disallowed by the judge.

Schultz

attempted to call Evans' veracity into question by asking Evans
if he had ever been convicted of a felony.

(Tr. at 29.)

Judge

Brian properly refused to permit that line of questioning, as the
conviction had been expunged.

(Tr. at 33.) 13

13

The impropriety of this line of questioning is
heightened by the fact that Schultz represented Evans in
connection with the expungement. (See Tr. at 32.)
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Even if Schultz had raised below either of the
allegations he makes in appellants' brief in support of his claim
of perjury, this Court could not consider those allegations here.
Appellants allege in their brief that the court should have
disregarded Evans' testimony for two reasons: first, that
E.M.L.P. fired Evans for dishonesty, and second, that Evans was
"scheduled for a perjury hearing" before Judge Frederick.

(See

Appellants' Br. at 15.)
The mere allegation of a false affidavit made in Judge
Frederick's court an the claim of dishonesty in the E.M.L.P.
letter, are inadmissible to impeach Evans.

Rule 609, Utah Rules

of Evidence, only allows use of a conviction.

Furthermore, it

requires the corroborating testimony of the witness, or a
properly certified copy of the conviction.
560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

State v. Peterson,

Here, Schultz only has an

unsubstantiated allegation.14

14

In addition to the evidentiary rules precluding the
admission of the alleged evidence of Evans' lack of truthfulness,
Schultz once again mischaracterizes the "facts" on which he
relies. By his reference to an alleged "perjury hearing" before
Judge Frederick, Schultz likely refers to a minute entry dated
May 11, 1993 in the matter of Evans-Bradshaw, Inc. v. Unimarc
Corp., No 920902551CV (Third Jud. Dist. Ct.). That minute entry
indicates that Evans, whom Schultz represented, filed an
affidavit which the other side moved to strike, at least in part,
on a claim of falsity. The court took that issue under
advisement "pending trial." The case was dismissed for failure
to prosecute and no further action on the allegation occurred.
(See Minute Entry, dated 5-11-93 and docket sheet, attached
hereto as Appendix Tab E.)
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Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence, would preclude both
the E.M.L.P. letter and the claim of a false affidavit to attack
Evans' credibility.

That rule precludes using extrinsic evidence

to show specific instances of the conduct of a witness, other
than a conviction introduced pursuant to Rule 609.

(Utah R.

Evid. 608.)
Finally, appellants have no basis for their claim that
the trial court "based its decision" on Evans' testimony.

The

court's statements from the bench showed it relied, in large
part, on the documentary evidence presented to it.
69-71.)

(See Tr. at

That evidence is consistent with the testimony of Evans

and forms a sufficient basis for the court's decision.
B.

The Court Correctly Ruled That Evans Had
Authority to Dismiss This Action on Behalf
of Sure-Tech.

Appellants next challenge the court's legal basis for
finding that the Evanses had authority to dismiss the case on
behalf of Sure-Tech.

For this challenge appellants rely on the

organizing documents of Sure-Tech.

Those documents do show that

Schultz and Pett were the only members of Sure-Tech prior to
November 17, 1994.

(See trial Exs. 4, A, B, D, F and G . ) 1 5
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Appellants also introduced exhibits to show that after
Evans accepted Schultz's offer to convey his interest, Schultz
attempted to reassert control of Sure-Tech. (See Exs. C and E.)
Those documents apparently were introduced in support of
Schultz's claim that he withdrew his offer to convey--a claim the
court properly rejected.
(See Points II and III above.) Neither
was dated between the date of Schultz's offer and the date of
Evans' acceptance, however, and both are inconsistent with Evans'
31

Those exhibits are immaterial, however, in light of the court's
factual finding that on November 17, 1994, Schultz and Pett
agreed to convey to Evans their entire interest in Sure-Tech,
whatever that interest was.

Thus, even if prior to January 7,

1995 appellants had owned 100% of Sure-Tech, when Sure-Tech
executed the stipulation of settlement in April 1995, they no
longer did.
Schultz then argues, without citation (and to this
Court for the first time), that "if the Evanses wished to hold
Mr. Schultz to his offer to convey ownership they had to file
suit" against him and Pett to enforce the agreement.

The Utah

Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act") contains no such
requirement, however.

Under both the Act and the Sure-Tech

0perating Agreement, this written agreement to transfer their
membership to the Evanses and give him authority to enter into
the stipulation of settlement effectively did so.

First, even

when management is vested in managers rather than members, the
members of a limited liability company retain the authority to
remove and replace managers.

(Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-125(2) (a)

(managers shall be any person "elected by members") and § 48-2b125(3) (managers hold office accorded them by members).)

acceptance and his acts subsequent to that acceptance.
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Second, the very section of the Act appellants cite
(Appellants' Br. at 16) supports the court's ruling that Evans
became a member of Sure-Tech by Schultz's November 17 offer:
[A]dditional members may be admitted as provided in the
operating agreement or, if the operating agreement does
not provide for the admission of additional members,
with the written consent of all members. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-122.

The operating agreement provides

that:
No new Members may be added without the unanimous
written consent of the present Members. New Members
may only be added by written consent of the present
Members and upon such terms and conditions as specified
by the present Members.
(Ex. A at 13, % 12.3.)
Appellants argue that these passages require more than
Schultz's and Pett's offer to convey their interests.
Appellants' Br. at 17.)

(See

Both the Act and the Operating Agreement

contain only one prerequisite to the admission of new members,
however: written consent of the old members.
Evans satisfied that requirement.

Schultz's letter to

Appellants' claim that Pett

and Schultz "never signed any written document agreeing to add
the Evanses or anyone else as members of Sure-Tech" (id.) is
simply false.

Once Evans accepted Schultz's offer, nothing more,

except filing the amended Articles with the state once the new
members were admitted, was required to admit Evans and transfer
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him to the authority to enter into the stipulation of
dismissal .16
If appellants seek to assert any failure to follow
formalities required by the Operating Agreement for the transfer
of Schultz's and Pett's interests to the Evanses, their failure
to raise the issue below bars it here.

Sukin, 842 P.2d at 926.

The entire focus of Schultz's argument below was whether or not
Schultz withdrew his November 17, 1994 offer, not whether that
offer was sufficient to actually convey any interest.
at 35-37, 39-42, 49, 51-52, 55, 59-60, 65, 66-67.)

(See Tr.

Schultz

argued only that the Evanses never had any interest in Sure-Tech
because he withdrew his offer to convey an interest to them,
thus, no one but he could have had authority to dismiss the
lawsuit.

The court found to the contrary, however.

Thus, once

the Evanses accepted the transfer on January 9, 1995, delivery
was complete and Schultz and Pett were powerless to regain
whatever interest they had previously owned.
C.

The Court Made No Reversible Error in its
Decision to Rule Without the November 22nd
Letter Before it or Concerning the Proffered
Testimony of Lisa Spivey.

In their and fourth challenges to the court's legal
rulings, appellants argue that the court committed reversible

16

The hearing transcript indicates that the court had
before it the Amendments to the Articles of Organization filed by
Lionel Koon, Fred Evans and Steve Evans, but no such document is
in the exhibits in the record. (See Tr. at 54-55.)
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error in not allowing Schultz the opportunity to get the November
22nd letter and not allowing Lisa Spivey to testify.

These

challenges suffer a greater infirmity than merely being legally
wrong.

They also misrepresent the trial court's rulings and

misstate the record in numerous respects.
Appellants first claim they did not have the November
22nd letter at the hearing because they were unaware that the
court would take evidence at the May 3 0th hearing.
assertion is false.

That

Mr. Daniels' request for the hearing, a copy

of which was sent to appellant Schultz, clearly stated that the
purpose of the hearing was to take evidence.
63.)

(See R. at 1261-

Moreover, regardless of their notice, appellants came to

the hearing prepared to put on evidence.

They introduced seven

documents into evidence, put Schultz on the witness stand, and
proffered the testimony of Lisa Spivey, who was present in court
and could have testified, had they chosen to have her do so.
(See Tr. at 53-64.)

In fact, the court gave appellants every

opportunity to put evidence into the record, admitting some over
the objection of plaintiff (see Tr. at 19), and allowing them to
put on additional evidence when the parties to this case were
ready to submit the issue.

(Tr. at 50.)

Appellants never

objected to the taking of evidence, asked for a continuance or
otherwise preserved their right to raise the issue before this
Court.
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In any event, Judge Brian did not prevent appellants
from putting the November 22nd letter into evidence.

They had

ample opportunity to produce the letter in court and simply
failed to do so.

Even if they didn't realize the November 22,

1994 letter would matter before the hearing, its importance
should have become apparent early in the hearing when Evans
testified that Schultz had offered to convey his interest in
Sure-Tech to Evans and offered into evidence Exhibit 6.
11-12.) 17

(Tr. at

Schultz then testified that he had revoked his offer

shortly after making it, and stated that he had the letter in his
files.

(Tr. at 27-28.)

letter.

(Tr. at 29.)

Evans denied ever having received such a

Appellants' attorney realized that without the November
22nd letter, he had "some evidentiary problems," and asked for a
"short recess" to confer with Schultz.

(Tr. at 35.)

Instead of

seeking a recess to get the letter, however, appellants' attorney
decided to "leave that issue, because of lack of evidence" and
move on to other arguments.

(Tr. at 3 7.)

Later in the hearing, Guyon did ask the court for more
time to send someone to procure the letter.

(Tr. at 4 9.)

The

court left it up to counsel for the parties, who indicated they
were ready to proceed, but "if the letter is here . . . when you
17

Guyon objected to the testimony on the ground that it
involved "settlement negotiations." The court properly overruled
that objection, and appellants have not complained of that ruling
here.
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are still considering it, I have no objection to it."
50.)

Guyon did not object to that arrangement.

(Id.)

(Tr. at
Guyon

then presented further evidence in an attempt to prove the
withdrawal of the offer.

(Tr. at 53-64.)

When Guyon again asked

for more time to get the letter at the close of evidence, the
court responded that "If the letter arrives before you are
through, assuming there isn't some type of filibuster in the
argument, we will consider it."

(Tr. at 65.)

At no time did Guyon object to this approach.

As the

court noted at the close of proceedings, the hearing lasted over
two hours.

(Tr. at 69.)

This gave appellants plenty of time to

send someone to get the letter.18

They cannot now complain of

their failure to have what they considered a key piece of
evidence.

Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d at 554.

A trial judge has

significant discretion over the control of his or her courtroom
and it is not an abuse of discretion to close the evidence two
hours into a one-half hour hearing.

See Russell v. Russell, 852

P.2d at 998; Utah R. Evid. 611(a).
It is also untrue that Judge Brian precluded Ms. Spivey
from testifying.

The court specifically invited appellants to

"augment the record by way of proffer or by calling

18

the

After Schultz's direct testimony, counsel for plaintiff
moved the court to strike his testimony regarding the revocation
letter. (Tr. at 59.) The court overruled the motion to "give
counsel an opportunity to connect it." Schultz then stated that
he had sent his nephew to get the letter. (Tr. at 60.)
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witnesses.11

(Tr. at 53 (emphasis added).)

Appellants called

Schultz (Tr. at 56), but chose to proffer testimony of Ms.
Spivey, Schultz's secretary, instead of putting her on the stand.
(Tr. at 53.)

The decision not to put Ms. Spivey on the stand,

even though she was in court, was thus appellants', not the
court's.
Nor did the court err in ruling that the Best Evidence
Rule, Rule 1004, Utah Rules of Evidence, required that Schultz
have the document in court.19

Rule 1002, Utah Rules of

Evidence, requires that "the original writing is required to
prove the content of a writing, except as otherwise provided in
these rules."20

Rule 1004 states that other evidence of the

contents of a writing is admissible if the original is lost or
destroyed, is not obtainable by any available judicial process,
is in the control of the opponent or the writing relates to a
collateral matter.
apply here.

Utah R. Evid. 1004.

None of those exceptions

Thus, it was incumbent on Schultz to have the

November 22, 1994 letter, or a photocopy of it, to prove its
contents.

19

Although the court allowed the testimony, it did
sustain Sure-Tech's motion to strike her testimony. It may be
that appellants challenge that ruling here, although they do not
specifically mention that ruling and did not take exception to
it.
20

Rule 1003 allows a duplicate to be used as an original
barring questions of authenticity.
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Even appellants admit as much.
19.)

(See Appellants' Br. at

Thus, as Ms. Spivey could not competently testify as to the

contents of the letter (and no such proffer was made), her
testimony was irrelevant.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that

the missing letter did in fact revoke Schultz's November 17th
offer,21 a revocation only becomes effective on communication to
the offeree.
1967).

See Butler v. Wehrley, 425 P.2d 130, 134 (Az. App.

This requirement of communication means that the offeree

must have actual knowledge of the revocation.
C.J.S. Contracts

§ 50D, p. 712.

Id., citing 17

Because Ms. Spivey could not

provide such evidence (see Tr. at 55), her proffered testimony
was immaterial, and the court's rulings concerning her testimony
were correct.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANTS'
RULE 60(b) MOTION
The trial court properly denied appellants' Rule 60(b)
motion, which is directed to the sound discretion of the judge.
See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993);
Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d 714, 717 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973) (construing identical
provision of federal Rule 60(b)(3)).

21

Their claim that the court

Such an assumption would be wrong. The November 22nd
letter, which appellants later sent to the court, contains no
language of revocation.
(See Appellee's Fact No. 24, R. at 1302;
see also Point V, below.)
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committed reversible error in denying the motion suffers legal
and factual infirmities, just as do appellants' other claims of
error.

The "proof" appellants provided to the court in their

motion falls so far short of being "irrefutable" (see Appellants'
Br. at 20), that, in fact, appellants' Rule 60(b) submission
provides further support for the trial court's decision.
Appellants made their motion under Rule 60(b)(3), which
allows a trial judge to set aside a final judgment or order on
the basis of fraud (whether heretofore denominated as intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party.

(Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).)

Although several

Utah cases refer to Rule 60(b)(3), none squarely address the
merits of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion.

Utah law is settled, however,

that fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See,
e.g.f Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) .
Federal courts interpreting the identical provision in
Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also
require clear and convincing evidence.

See, e.g., Wilkin v.

Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d at 717; see also Ervin v. Wilkinson, 701
F.2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1983); Jennings v. Hicklin, 587 F.2d 946,
948 (8th Cir. 1978) .

The fraud must have been discovered after

the entry of judgment, and the movant must show he would have had
a good claim or defense.

Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 466 F.2d at

717.
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Here, appellants simply failed to carry their burden on
their Rule 60(b)(3) motion.

No action by the parties to the

litigation prevented Schultz from presenting the evidence.
Ervin, 701 F.2d at 61.

Cf.

Moreover, a review of the letter itself

demonstrates that it in no way supports Schultz's claims.

It

simply does not amount to a revocation of Schultz's November 17th
offer to convey his and Pett's Sure-Tech interests.
Appellants' Fact No. 24; R. at 13 02.)

(See

Finally, as shown above in

Point I V . C , appellants could have had the letter in court, had
they chosen to.

Schultz admitted at the hearing he had the

missing letter in his file.

(Tr. at 27-28.)

The appellants

failed to meet their burden on their Rule 60(b)(3) motion.

The

trial court's denial of that motion was well within its
discretion and should be sustained.
POINT VI
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD DAMAGES TO E.M.L.P. AGAINST
SCHULTZ PURSUANT TO RULE 33, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE,
FOR BRINGING THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires the Court to award sanctions against a party or a
party's attorney for bringing a frivolous appeal: " [I]f the court
determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages
. . . ."

Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P.

(Emphasis added.)

Damages

may include single or double costs, and may include attorneys'

41

fees.

Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P.; Porco v. Porcof 752 P.2d 365,

369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The rule defines a frivolous appeal as "one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based o a
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."
Utah R. App. P. 33(b); see also Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 41617 (Utah 1990); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309-10 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).

In Hunt, the Utah Supreme Court rules that "[s]ince

a valid professional evaluation would reveal a complete lack of
merit to the cause of action and because of the otherwise
unprofessional presentation of this case on appeal, we hold that
plaintiff's counsel violated rule 33 and is therefore subject to
sanction."

785 P.2d at 417.

In O'Brien, this court fund an

appeal to be frivolous where the defendant's claim simply
controverted the findings of the lower court and was "without
basis in law or fact."

744 P.2d at 310.

Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have awarded
Rule 33 sanctions in other cases as well.

Thus, in Eames v.

Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Court awarded
sanctions where appellant had no basis for his arguments and
mischaracterized and misrepresented the law and the evidence.22

22

In Eames, decided before the 1990 revision of Rule 33
that added the definitions in section (b), this Court found that
"frivolous" included a requirement that the appellant have
brought the appeal in bad faith. That requirement was rejected
in O'Brien. 744 P.2d at 309-10.
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In Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
this Court applied sanctions against an attorney who chose to
ignore the decision of the lower court and attempted to
relitigate the issues on appeal.

Id. at 63.

Here, the actions of Schultz, as detailed above, are
especially egregious.

After having been disqualified by the

trial court from representing the plaintiff, Schultz challenged
the plaintiff's authority to replace him based on his claimed
ownership of plaintiff.

He did so without entering an appearance

in the case, however, and did not put into evidence the key
documents on which he now relies to show tat he revoked his offer
to convey his interest in plaintiff to Evans.

Having been

unsuccessful both at the hearing and in his Rule 60(b) motion,
Schultz now attempts to relitigate the issues here.
His appeal meets the definition of a "frivolous appeal"
in three ways.

First, it mischaracterizes and misrepresents both

the law (to the extent the appeal concerns itself with the law at
all) (see Point IV above) and the facts (see Point II above).
Eames, 735 P.2d at 397.

Second, the appeal is a naked attempt to

relitigate the very issues decided below.
at 63/ Hunt, 785 P.2d at 417.

See Schoney, 863 P.2d

Third, the appeal has necessitated

the response of defendant E.M.L.P., to whom Schultz's unfounded
charges are merely collateral and who negotiated in good faith
with Evans to reach the stipulated settlement of the litigation.
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Under these circumstances, defendant E.M.L.P. requests
that the Court enter sanctions against Schultz and Pett for
double their costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in
responding to this frivolous appeal, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
X
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's May 30, 1995
order of dismissal, as appellants here are nonparties and as such
have no standing to bring the appeal, and because appellants have
failed to show any factual or legal error by the court.
DATED this S ^

day of March, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER
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Nanci Snow Bockelie
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT
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By
Attorneys for Appellees E.M.L.
Projects, Ltd., Ecology
Management, Ltd. and Waste
Products, Inc.
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